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1 Introduction
Whilst all countries regulate rm entry, the extent and nature of the regulations vary widely
across the world.1 Overly-restrictive regulations are likely to be ine¢ cient and have knock-on
e¤ects on competition, innovation, employment, wages and economic growth. As a consequence,
deregulation, and in particular the removal of restrictions on rm entry, has been a signicant
policy recommendation during the last few decades. These ideas also receive support in aca-
demic research. For example, Aghion et al. (2008) argue that deregulation associated with
dismantling the License Raj in India led to rm entry and output growth. Aghion et al. (2009)
show that policy reforms a¤ecting rm entry conditions in the UK during the Thatcher era
fostered incumbent innovation and productivity growth. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) show
that increased entry regulations in the retail trade industry in France had a negative e¤ect on
job creation and employment growth.2
This paper investigates the e¤ects of deregulation on entry, competition, and the returns
to education and skill. Using linked employer-employee data for the universe of private sector
rms and workers in Portugal, we analyse the "On the Spot Firm" program, an initiative
created to reduce the time, cost, and complexity of registering a new business. Prior to 2005,
an entrepreneur would need to visit several public o¢ ces to start a business. In all, it took
11 procedures, 20 forms, and 78 days, making it slower than in any other EU country (World
Bank, 2006). The "On the Spot Firm" program created one-stop shops where entrepreneurs
could register a company in a single visit. As a result of this reform, the process of starting
a business can now be completed in less than an hour. Between 2005 and 2010, business
registration fees dropped from 13.5% to 3% of GDP per capita, and Portugal rose from 113 to
26 in the "Doing Business" ranking of economies.
We exploit the cross-time and cross-municipality variation in the implementation of the
"On the Spot Firm" program to identify and measure changes in the returns to education and
skill from rm entry deregulation.3 Using the roll-out of the "On the Spot Firm" program
as an exogenous source of increased product market competition, we provide quasi-natural
experimental evidence on the impact of entry deregulation on wages. The unusually rich and
detailed information from the employer-employee dataset Quadros de Pessoal also allows us
to obtain estimates that account for individual- or match (rm-worker)-specic unobserved
heterogeneity, as well as changes in industry composition and regional e¤ects.
1Djankov et al. (2002) report that while in Italy an entrepreneur needs to follow 16 di¤erent procedures, pay
US$3946 in fees, and wait at least 62 business days to acquire the permits to start a business, an entrepreneur in
Canada can nish the process in two days by paying US$280 in fees and completing only two procedures.
2The positive e¤ects in Aghion et al. (2008) are found in pro-employer states. In Aghion et al. (2009), sectors
close to the technology frontier benet because successful innovation allows incumbents to survive the threat.
The negative e¤ect in Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) is unambiguous.
3The program expanded over time to municipalities across the country and by the end of 2009 there were
164 one-stop shops dispersed throughout Portugal (see Figure 1 in Section 3).
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In line with theoretical results linking product market competition and relative wages (see
Section 2), our estimates suggest that after the reform, the relative wage of university graduates
increased by around 5%, while that of high-skilled workers increased by around 3%. In our
empirical specications, we control for individual xed e¤ects, thus eliminating potential biases
arising from unobserved individual characteristics, and we control for industry, municipality,
and year e¤ects, to parse out any industry or region characteristics or business shocks that
might a¤ect our outcomes. We further saturate the models and include trends by municipality-
skill (education) to account for any di¤erential pre-existing trends in wages. In all cases, we
nd that the wage premium to education and skill remains similar in magnitude and statistical
signicance. Finally, we control for rm-worker (match) xed e¤ects. In those specications,
the e¤ect of the reform on returns to education and skill is identied from individuals who
stay in the same rm after the deregulation. Therefore, the wage e¤ect we identify reects not
merely higher wages in new jobs, but is commensurate with education and skills becoming more
valuable after the reform.
We also nd that the "On the Spot Firm" program had a positive and statistically signicant
e¤ect on rm creation. This is consistent with results reported in other studies interested in
identifying the e¤ect of deregulation on rm entry (for example Bruhn, 2011, uses a similar rm
entry deregulation in Mexico). Our estimates show that the deregulation had a negative and
statistically signicant e¤ect on industry concentration ratios, and on the Herndahl-Hirschman
index (HHI), suggesting that it increased competition within industries. Because common
measures of competition face a number of limitations, which include potential endogeneity,
correlation with omitted variables, and non-monotonicity, we believe that the main contribution
of our paper is to use the "On the Spot Firm" as an exogenous shock that increased competition
to estimate its e¤ects on the returns to skill and education.
Our results of increased wage premia for skills (and education), following an episode of
increased product market competition, complement those in Guadalupe (2007). She studies the
e¤ect of increased competition on the returns to skill resulting from the UKs entry into the
European Single Market Program and the 1996 appreciation of the British pound. She forcefully
demonstrates that the returns to skill within an industry increase with foreign competition,
whereas our analysis focusses exclusively on increased domestic competition. As such, we are
able to provide independent evidence of the importance of greater product market competition
on wages.
Our paper also contributes to a literature studying the e¤ects of industry-specic deregu-
lation episodes on wages, such as Rose (1987) and Card (1986).4 However, we investigate an
economy-wide episode of entry deregulation, and study the e¤ects on the returns to education
and skills, a di¤erent aspect of the wage structure. Finally, a broader literature has shown
4See section 2 for a review of this literature.
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that entry and competition spur productivity growth and innovation (e.g. Aghion et al., 2009;
Djankov, 2006; Gri¢ th and Harrison, 2004; Gri¢ th, 2001; and Blundell et al., 1999). With most
European countries experiencing poor economic performance, high unemployment, and weak
scal positions, policies with the potential to raise growth, such as the reform studied here,
are very appealing. Our results suggest that they may have implications for the distribution of
income, which governments should at least be aware of.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical background
and related literature. In section 3 we describe the "On the Spot Firm" program. Section 4
describes the data used and presents descriptive statistics and correlations between measures
of competition and the returns to education and skill. Section 5 studies the e¤ect of the reform
on rm creation and on measured competition. Section 6 presents the quasi-natural experiment
and discusses the results of the deregulation on the returns to education and skill. The last
section concludes.
2 Theoretical Background and Related Literature
To the extent that the business registration reform analyzed in this paper reduced entry barriers,
it increased competition in the product market. In this section, we discuss the theoretical
link between product market competition and relative wages and, following Guadalupe (2007),
outline a simple framework that extends the ideas in Boone (2000) to the labour market.5
Boone (2000) argues that with increasing product market competition e¢ cient rms are
able to exploit their cost advantage more aggressively, leading to a reallocation of output from
ine¢ cient to e¢ cient rms. This reallocation raises both the prots and the size (total variable
costs) of a rm relative to those that are less e¢ cient. By implication, with increased compet-
ition, a given cost di¤erence between rms is consistent with a larger di¤erence in prots. In
the labor market context, if skilled (or educated) workers are more productive than less skilled
ones, and produce at lower costs, Boones result on the prot-cost relationship implies that
skills become more valuable with greater product market competition. If prots become more
sensitive to skills as competition increases, rms will then have an incentive to pay more for
skilled workers.
Consider the following stylized model. There are N workers, with di¤ering levels of pro-
ductivity (skill). Each worker is employed by a rm, which competes in an imperfectly com-
petitive product market. The worker, who is treated as a quasi-xed cost, inuences the other
elements of marginal costs, with greater skills permitting lower costs. Firms are assumed to
rst compete for workers with di¤erent skills, and after workers are allocated to rms, and
5Another strand of theoretical papers has examined the e¤ect of competition on the provision of managerial
incentives in a principal-agent framework (see Raith, 2003; Schmidt, 1997; Sutton, 1991; and Hart, 1983). Also
see Vives (2008).
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production takes place, rms compete in the product market. For simplicity, the skill level is
assumed to be known by both rms and workers, and wages are posted for each skill level.
Let (ci; ) = [pi()   ci]yi() denote rms is prot, gross of xed costs, where pi is the
price, yi is output, and ci > 0 is the unit production cost. The parameter  captures the level of
competition in the product market (such as the number of rms or entry barriers).6 With prot
gross of wages increasing in the workersproductivity, we also have @=d@ci < 0. The model is
solved by backward induction. At stage two, depending on the type of competition assumed,
rms chose the gross-prot-maximizing price or quantity. At stage one, rms compete for
workers by o¤ering wages, !(ci; ), accounting for the optimized gross prot function. Workers
accept an o¤er only if it is above their reservation wage, b > 0. Firms then maximize net prots,
(ci; ) = (ci; )  !(ci; ), subject to the workersparticipation constraint. That is,
max(ci; ) = (ci; )  !I(ci; ) (1)
s:t: !I(ci; )  min f!J(ci; ); bg ; for all J (2)
where !J(ci; ) is the wage o¤ered by any rm other than I. In equilibrium, rms o¤er the
same wage, !I(ci; ) = !J(ci; ) = !(ci; ), and prots can be expressed as,
(ci; )  !(ci; ) = (cj ; )  !(cj ; ) = N (cN ; )  b; for all i; j (3)
!(ci; ) = (ci; )  N (cN ; ) + b (4)
where N (cN ; ) is the gross prot of the N th rm that hires the N th-skill worker, who gets paid
her reservation wage. Firms have no incentive to change the wages o¤ered since that would not
increase their prots.
Imposing a zero-prot condition, N (cN ; )   b = 0, implies equilibrium wages are such
that, !(ci; ) = (ci; ). Note that @!(ci; )=@ci = @(ci; )=@ci, which is negative, because
gross prots are decreasing in costs and increasing in skills. As Guadalupe (2007) shows, the
su¢ cient condition for an increase in competition to generate an increase in the returns to skill
in this setting is:
@2!(ci; )
@ci@
=
@2(ci; )
@ci@
< 0 (5)
Intuitively, for a given number of rms, a rise in  causes the high-skill wage to increase
relative to the low-skill wage for analogous reasons to Boone (2000): the gap between relative
marginal costs to relative prots increases with competition. Our paper investigates the implic-
6The competition parameter depends on the model assumed, and on the way competition can increase in an
industry (e.g. through an increase in the number of rms, in the elasticity of substitution between goods, or a
cost reduction).
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ations of (5) from an empirical perspective. By analysing the "On the Spot Firm" reform we
can identify precisely how an increase in competition a¤ects the returns to skill and education.
Our nding of greater wage dispersion following increased competition is consistent with the
type of reallocation e¤ect present here.
It is also important to note that the literature on wage inequality suggests two alternative
routes through which competition may a¤ect the returns to skill. First, if increased competi-
tion promotes technical change, and if technology is biased in favor of skilled workers, increasing
returns to skill arise through rising relative demand. However, we show the e¤ect of the "On
the Spot Firm" reform on the returns to skill and education is not driven by skill-biased tech-
nical change, supporting a more direct channel of increased competition. Second, if increased
competition leads to less unionization, and assuming unionization generates wage compression
(Card, 2001), more competition could also result in greater returns to skill. However, the labor
market in Portugal is characterized by widespread collective bargaining, where wages are set
for non-unionized as well as unionized workers via extension mechanisms that transfer agree-
ments from one set of workers to another. Combined with the fact that union density remained
constant throughout the period, this largely removes the concern that the reform might have
a¤ected the wage distribution via changes in union behavior in our analysis.
Finally, there is empirical evidence linking changes in domestic competition to wages, such
as Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) and Card (1986), who study the e¤ect of deregulation in
the airline industry in the U.S. on relative earnings. Similarly, Hirsch (1993) and Rose (1987)
analyze wage responses to deregulation in the trucking industry, and Cuñat and Guadalupe
(2009), Wozniak (2007), and Black and Strahan (2001), study the e¤ect of deregulation in the
U.S. commercial banking industry on workers and executives compensation. We focus on a
di¤erent feature of the wage structure to these papers (namely, the returns to education and
skills) and our paper contributes to this literature by investigating the e¤ects of a comprehensive
episode of entry deregulation.7
3 Entry Deregulation in Portugal: The "On the Spot Firm"
Program
The "On the Spot Firm" (Empresa na Hora) program, established in 2005 by the Portuguese
Ministry of Justice, was aimed at reducing red tape and alleviating the bureaucratic burden
associated with setting up a new rm. Prior to 2005, to start a new rm, an entrepreneur would
need to visit several public agencies, extending over a period of 78 days. In March 2005, a new
Prime Minister took o¢ ce, and in May the government created the Unit for Coordination of
7 In general, there is also a vast literature on wage inequality, which informs the work we conduct here. See,
for example, Autor et al. (1998) and Juhn et al. (1993). Card (2001) and Machin (1997) study the e¤ect of
labour market institutions. Katz and Autor (1999) provide a survey of this literature.
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Administrative Modernization (UCMA) to bring together the Ministries of Justice, Finance,
Economy, and Labour and Social Security, which were all involved in registering a new busi-
ness. The main task of the UCMA was to coordinate and aggregate measures by the di¤erent
ministries. The "On the Spot Firm" program established one-stop shops, where entrepreneurs
were able to register a company in less than an hour. Legal and commercial registration is
also completed, and the company identication card, corporate tax payer number, and social
security number, are all handed over on the same day.
The law that created the "On the Spot Firm" was issued in July, and in the same month pilot
one-stop shops were launched in four municipalities (Coimbra, Aveiro, Barreiro and Moita).8
The program expanded over time, and by the end of 2009 there were 164 shops dispersed
across 308 municipalities throughout the country, covering most of mainland Portugal and the
autonomous region of Madeira. Figure 1 below gives a graphical representation of the opening
dates and geographical spread of the one-stop shops between 2005 and 2009.9
[Figure 1 about here]
In 2007, the average time to set up a company through the "On the Spot Firm" was 47
minutes, with one procedure at one o¢ ce desk. By 2008, over 70% of new rms were established
through the "On the Spot Firm".10 The reform in 2005-2006 became part of a larger package
for administrative and legislative simplication called "Simplex". This program is one of the
most successful initiatives for red tape reduction in the industrialized world.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Data Description
The main data source used in this paper is the Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a longitudinal data set
with linked information on workers and rms based in Portugal. These data have been collected
annually by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity, and answering the survey
is mandatory for all rms employing at least one worker. The data include all rms with one or
more employees within the Portuguese private sector. In 2009, the most recent year for which
the data is available, the dataset includes over three million workers and about 400 thousand
rms. Each rm and each worker have a unique registration number which allows them to be
8The law that established the On the Spot Firmprogram is Decreto-Lei 111/2005.
9Entrepreneurs can register a new company under the "On the Spot Firm" program in any of the o¢ ces
located across Portugal. Branstetter et al. (2013), document that the fraction of rms registered outside their
local municipality is trivially small, and also provide details on industries for which one-stop shops cannot be
used (which are mainly in the nance and insurance industries). We exclude observations in these industries from
our analysis.
10See http://www.empresanahora.pt/ENH/sections/EN_homepage.
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traced over time.11
In general, the information each year refers to the situation observed in the month when the
survey is collected, and it covers the rm, each of its plants and each of its workers. Inform-
ation on workers includes, for example, gender, age, education level (schooling), level of skill,
occupation, type of contract of employment, hiring date in the rm, promotions, monthly hours
of work (normal and overtime) and earnings, which are split into each of its components (base
wage, seniority payments, regular and irregular benets and overtime pay). Firm level data
include, for example, the year of creation, industry, location, total number of workers, num-
ber of establishments, sales volume, legal structure and ownership structure (equity breakdown
among domestic private, public or foreign). The administrative nature of the data and the legal
requirement that the data is publicly accessible in the rm result in its exceptional coverage
and reliability.12
We use data collected each year from 2002 to 2009.13 We restrict our analysis to private sec-
tor manufacturing and service rms, excluding agriculture, shing and mining, distinguishing 46
industries. Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the description (and the percentage distribution
of observations) of the SIC 2-digit industries considered. The resulting sample includes 431,692
distinct rms (contributing with 1,871,296 rm-year observations) and 3,899,878 workers (con-
tributing 16,485,860 worker-year observations) over the period. We identify the creation of new
rms using the reported year the rm was constituted. A rm is considered to be a start-up if
the year of creation is equal to the year of analysis.14 The distribution of rms (existing rms
and startups) and workers by year is shown in Table 1. Although the stock of rms and workers
increased over the period, in 2009 we start seeing the e¤ects of the global economic crisis, and
observe net rm and job destruction. Regarding the "On the Spot Firm" program, 23% of the
new rms were created in municipalities with one-stop shops in 2005, rising to 70% within 3
years. Overall, in our data, 42,567 rms were created within municipalities with one-stop shops.
[Table 1 about here]
The monthly wage of the worker is constructed by summing: (i) the base pay - gross wage for
the normal hours of work; (ii) tenure related payments; and (iii) regular benets. Real hourly
11Each rm entering the dataset is assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying number. The Ministry of
Labor and Social Solidarity ensures that rms that have already reported are not assigned a di¤erent identication
number. Similarly, each worker is assigned a unique identifying number based on the social security number. We
use these identiers to follow workers and rms over time.
12The requirement of public availability enables monitoring by the Ministry of Labor that the rms conform to
the law, for example with regard to illegal work. The QP data has been used by Cardoso and Portugal (2005) to
study the di¤erence between contractual and actual wages; by Cabral and Mata (2003) to study the evolution of
the rm size distribution; by Blanchard and Portugal (2001) to compare the U.S. and Portuguese labor markets;
among others.
13QP data were not collected in 2001, and hence our analysis starts in 2002 rather than 2000.
14Because the survey is collected in October, we recover some information on rm births if the reported year
of creation is t   1 but the rm is observed for the rst time in t. In these cases, we set the year of creation of
the rm to t:
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wages, used in our specications, are computed as real monthly wages (excluding overtime
pay) divided by normal monthly hours of work (excluding overtime hours). The QP data
includes information on both the education levels and the skill levels attained by each worker.
We exploit this information and investigate the e¤ects of the deregulation on the returns to
education, and also on the returns to skill. The level of education is recorded according to the
International Standard Classication of Education (ISCED), approved by UNESCO in 1997.
The correspondence between ISCED levels and years of schooling in Portugal is: ISCED 1 - rst
and second stages of basic education (up to 6 years of schooling); ISCED 2 - lower secondary
education (9 years of schooling); ISCED 3 - upper secondary education (12 years of schooling);
ISCED 5/6 - higher education (more than 15 years of schooling, corresponding to university
degrees).15
Workers are also classied into to 8 levels of qualication depending on the complexity and
responsibility of the tasks performed and the skill requirement of the task.16 Table A.2 in
the Appendix shows a detailed description of the hierarchical levels and their skill content in
accordance with the law.17 For our analysis, the skill levels were collapsed into three categories:
high- (levels 1 to 4), medium- (level 5) and low-skilled workers (levels 6 to 8). In order to
increase our condence that the previous data refer to skills/qualications rather than jobs, we
also include the occupation as separate control in the regression analysis.18
Our regressions include additional characteristics of the workers as covariates: gender, age
and tenure (and their squares), the type of contract of employment (whether open-end or closed-
end contract), and occupation. We also control for rm characteristics: log of the size (measured
by the number of workers employed by the rm), ownership status (private, public or foreign
owned, depending on whether more than 50% of the rmssocial capital is owned by private,
public or foreign investors), whether the rm is an exporter, and whether the rm is multi-
plant.19 Descriptive statistics by education and skill levels are presented in Table A.3. In our
sample, 12% of the workers have a university degree, and 23% are high-skilled. Medium-skilled
workers represent the largest share (41%) of the labour force. Amongst the high-skilled, 42%
have a university degree or higher; this conrms that our measure of skill is not a simple output
15 In Portugal, there is no degree corresponding to ISCED level 4; and it is not possible to distinguish between
ISCED levels 5 and 6 from the data.
16The 8 levels of qualication are: 1 Top executives (top management); 2 Intermediary executives (middle
management); 3 Supervisors, team leaders and foremen; 4 Higher-skilled professionals; 5 skilled professionals;
6 semi-skilled professionals; 7 non-skilled professionals; 8 Apprentices, interns and trainees.
17See the Decreto Lei 121/78 of July.
18Occupations are recorded in the QP data at the six-digit level in accordance with the International Standard
Classication of Occupations (ISCO) 1988. We use ISCO-88s major groups: 1 - Directors; 2 - Intellectual and
scientic specialists; 3 - Professional and technical; 4 - Administrative and managerial; 5 - Clerical and sales
workers; 6 - Agriculture, silviculture and shing; 7 - Production and related workers; 8 - Equipment operators
and labourers, 9 - Unqualied workers. We aggregate occupations 1 and 2 into one group and occupations 6 and
7 into another single group.
19 Information on exporters is from the International Trade dataset collected by the Portuguese National
Institute of Statistics (INE). This dataset includes the universe of monthly export and import transactions by
Portuguese rms.
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of academic achievement of the workers. Conversely, 78% of highly educated workers performs
more complex (high-skill) tasks. Regarding the "On the Spot Firm", 41% of observations are
located in municipalities with one-stop shops.20
4.2 Industry Concentration and Returns to Education and Skill
Before we study the e¤ects of the "On the Spot Firm", we start by documenting the correlation
between competition and wages. We use a common measure of competition - the fraction of
industry employment by the ve largest rms (CR5).21 To assess the relationship between
competition and the returns to education and skill, we regress the logarithm of real hourly
wages of individual i; in rm j, in industry s, municipality m, with educational level (skill
level) k in year t on the measure of competition, and its interactions with education or skill
levels (ISCED1 and low-skill are the omitted categories), among other controls. We estimate
the following specication:
lnwijsmkt = + CIsmt + Sk;it + (CIsmt  Sk;it) + X 0it + Z 0jt + d() + ijsmkt (6)
Where CIsmt is the CR5 concentration ratio for industry s (SIC 2-digit), in municipality m, at
time t, and Sk;it is the educational attainment (skill level) of the worker, as described in Section
4.1. X 0it is a matrix of individual characteristics, and Z
0
jt is a matrix of rm characteristics
(as described in Section 4.1, Table A.3). We control for unobserved permanent individual
characteristics (di), and include industry (ds), municipality, (dm), and time (dt) dummies to
account for unobserved industry and municipality characteristics and business shocks that a¤ect
all rms and workers. Our coe¢ cient of main interest is : It captures the correlation between
returns to education (skill) and the industrys level of competition. If competition is positively
correlated with the returns to education (skill), we expect the sign of  to be negative since
concentration ratios are inverse measures of competition.
Results from estimating equation (6) are reported in Table 2. The upper part reports results
for the e¤ect of competition on the returns to skill, while the lower part reports results for the
returns to education. In column (1) we include individual xed e¤ects, industry and year
dummies, and age and tenure (and their squares) of the worker as covariates. In column (2)
we also include dummies for education (skill) interacted with year, thus allowing for changes
20Since we want to interpret the e¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on wages, we do not consider
municipalities of the last year of introduction of one-stop shops. We removed all records (for all years) in
municipalities where one-stop shops were introduced in 2009.
21We alternatively used the CR5 of sales, and the Herndahl-Hirschman index of industry employment and
sales. The results using these measures, available upon request, remain robust. Other measures of competition
include the Panzar and Rosse (1977) H-statistic (the sum of input elasticities estimated from regressing gross
revenue on a vector of input prices and other controls); the Lerner (1934) index (di¤erence between price and
marginal cost at the prot-maximizing rate of output); and Boones (2000) competition measure based on relative
prots, estimated by Boone et al. (2005). These alternative measures require data on revenues, input prices,
prots, variable costs or prices, which are not available to us currently.
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in returns to education (skill) over time in a exible way. Column (3) further saturates the
model with dummies for municipality, and includes the occupation and type of contract of the
worker, the log of size and the ownership of the rm, as well as whether the rm is multiplant
or exporter.
[Table 2 about here]
The results for returns to skill show that the coe¢ cients of interest, on the interaction
between the skill levels and the concentration ratios, are negative and statistically signicant in
all specications. This is suggestive of a positive correlation between measured competition and
returns to skill - increases in competition are associated with a wider gap between the wages
of the high- and low-skilled. Contrary to the results for skills, which show a clear negative
correlation between the CR5 and the returns to skill, we do not nd a di¤erential e¤ect of
concentration on wages by education levels (lower panel of Table 2). The coe¢ cients on the
interaction between the CR5 and education are not statistically signicant in the more saturated
specications (columns (2) and (3)). The results from Table 2 are only suggestive of correlations,
and should be regarded as descriptive rather than showing a causal e¤ect. To try to establish
a causal link between increased competition and returns to education and skill, in the sections
that follow we use the "On the Spot Firm" program as an arguably more exogenous source of
increased competition.
5 "On the Spot Firm" Program, Entry, and Industry Concen-
tration
This section investigates the e¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" on rm entry and concentration,
to assess the validity of the reform as a source of increased competition. Identication is based
on the assumption that the "On the Spot Firm" program was not introduced over time in
municipalities in a systematic way that is correlated with pre-existing trends in the outcome
variables. In the following sections we conduct several robustness checks and control for pre-
existing trends by municipality and skill (or education) levels when estimating the e¤ects on the
returns to skill (education).22 As a further test of our identication strategy, we rst investigate
whether the order in which municipalities adopted the policy is correlated with pre-reform trends
in the variables of interest.
We check whether early adopting municipalities (those that implemented the reform in 2005
and 2006) di¤er from late adopting municipalities (those where the reform was implemented
from 2007 onwards) in terms of initial growth trends (between 2002 and 2004) of average wages
22We nd no evidence of such trends, which grants validity to our experiment and identication strategy.
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by education and skill levels, the number of new rms, and industry concentration.23 Table 3
reports summary statistics for trends of the outcome variables in the pre-reform period. We
report averages of the variables for the group of late adopting municipalities (Column (1))
and for the group of early adopters (column (2)). In column (3) we report the di¤erence, and
column (4) presents the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis of equality between the means
(proportions). Overall, we nd no statistically signicant di¤erence between the municipalities
that adopted in the rst two years of the program and those that adopted in the last two years
in our sample.
[Table 3 about here]
To study the e¤ects of the business registration reform on rm entry and competition, we
estimate the e¤ect of the reform on (i) the number of new rms created (positive correlation
expected), and on (ii) the top-ve concentration ratio (CR5) and the HHI as (inverse) measures
of competition (negative correlation expected). That is, we estimate the following equations:
NewFirmssmt = f(Spotmt; d()) (7)
CIsmt = f(Spotmt; d()) (8)
In all specications, the "On the Spot Firm" dummy variable (Spotmt) takes the value of 1 in the
years when and after a one-stop shop was introduced in municipality m, and 0 otherwise.24 The
dependent variable in equation (7) is the number of new rms created by municipality-industry-
year; and in equation (8), CIsmt, is one of the measures of competition, dened in the previous
section. For each analysis we regress di¤erent model specications, which include as regressors:
(1) the "On the Spot Firm" covariate along with industry indicators to parse out any industry
characteristics that may a¤ect the outcomes, and year xed e¤ects to control for aggregate
trends (Spotmt, ds and dt); (2) the reform dummy, industry xed e¤ects and municipality xed
e¤ects to further control for municipality characteristics that may a¤ect entry in particular
industries (Spotmt, ds and dm); (3) the reform dummy and industry, municipality and year
xed e¤ects simultaneously (Spotmt, ds, dm and dt); (4) nally, we control for industry and year
xed e¤ects and saturate the model further by including municipality-specic linear trends, to
absorb secular trends at the municipality level in the outcomes of interest (Spotmt, ds, dt and
dm  t). We cluster errors by municipality, the level of introduction of the policy.
Table 4 reports results for the e¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" on rm creation. The top
panel relates to a linear model of the number of rms created, while the bottom panel relates to
a negative binomial model for the same count data. The columns of the table include di¤erent
23We follow Branstetter et al. (2013) and Bruhn (2011) in this test of the identication strategy.
24See Figure 1 for an overview of opening dates of the one-stop shops in Portuguese municipalities across the
country.
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sets of xed e¤ects as explained above. The results suggest that the entry deregulation reform
increased the number of new rms created. The coe¢ cient on the reform dummy is always
positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level, across all specications, implying that the
"On the Spot Firm" policy will have changed the degree of competition within Portuguese
industries.
[Table 4 about here]
Our results on rm entry are in line with those obtained by Branstetter et al. (2013) and
Bruhn (2011), who investigate the e¤ect of simplied business entry registration on the number
of new rms and on job creation. Branstetter et al. use the same deregulation episode as we do
and nd that the reform increased the number of new rms per 100,000 inhabitants by around
17%. Using a similar reform in Mexico, Bruhn nds a 5% increase in the number of registered
new businesses and a 2.2% increase in employment. The e¤ect of this type of reform on the
returns to education and skills has received little attention in previous literature, however, and
that is the main focus of our study.
Table 5 reports results from estimating equation (8), the e¤ect of the reform on competition,
as measured by the top-ve concentration ratio (top panel), and by the HHI (bottom panel)
of sales.25 For each measure of concentration, we report results from a linear regression model
and from a fractional dependent variable model - the fractional probit, as proposed by Papke
and Wooldridge (1996). In the specications reported in columns (1) and (2), which control for
industry and year xed e¤ects, and industry and municipality characteristics, respectively, thus
absorbing any time-invariant characteristics of the industry and the municipality that may a¤ect
concentration, we obtain negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cients on the reform variable.
Results remain robust in column (4) when we saturate the model further with municipality-
specic linear trends (dm  t), while also controlling for industry and year xed e¤ects. This
suggests that the "On the Spot Firm" reform is associated with decreased concentration.
In column (3) of the table, the coe¢ cient on the reform variable is not statistically signicant.
This stems from the fact that since the reform dummy variable is dened at the municipality-
year level, and since concentration measures typically display little variation in these dimensions,
including industry, municipality and year dummies simultaneously absorbs signicant sample
variation rendering the coe¢ cient on the reform variable insignicant.26 Moreover, common
measures of competition such as CR5 or HHI face a number of well-known limitations, including
potential endogeneity, correlation with omitted variables, and non-monotonicity (see Boone,
25All results reported in Table 5 remain robust if we use CR5 or HHI of employment instead of sales. These
results are available upon request.
26Jointly, the variables are statistically signicant. We also nd evidence of collinearity in this specication, as
suggested by a multicollinearity condition number greater than 100 (see Belsey, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980), which
might a¤ect the estimated coe¢ cients and their standard errors.
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2000; and Sutton 1991), and thus may not fully capture increased competition resultant from
rm entry after the reform. Overall, the results reported in this section provide strong evidence
that the business registration reform increased rm entry, and some evidence that it increased
measured competition within industries and municipalities. Thus we now proceed to use the
deregulation reform as a more exogenous source of increased competition to study the e¤ects
on returns to skill and education.
[Table 5 about here]
6 The Regulatory Quasi-Natural Experiment
The main results in this paper come from an exogenous event that reformed business registration
in Portugal. As shown in the previous section, this reform has lead to increased rm entry, and
is associated with increased product market competition. In this section, we investigate the
e¤ect of the reform directly on the returns to education and skills. Figure 2 in the Appendix
presents suggestive evidence; it shows the wage growth di¤erential between the high- and the
low-educated and between the high- and low-skilled groups for Lisbon. Wage growth di¤erentials
increase after 2005, the year when the "On the Spot Firm" was introduced in that municipality.27
6.1 Empirical Strategy
We use cross-municipality-specic and cross-time variation in the implementation of the business
registration reform in Portugal to identify the e¤ect of the deregulation on the returns to skill
and education. As discussed in Section 3, this policy change was an unanticipated and exogenous
policy change, and progressively rolled-out across municipalities, as shown in Figure 1.28 Given
that the timing of adoption of the reform varied across municipalities, we can exploit this
time variation in our identication strategy. We provide di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimates of
changes in the returns to educational attainment and skill levels. Eligible rms (rms within
eligible industries) and individuals in municipalities with one-stop shops for business registration
constitute the treatment group.
We have shown in the previous section that early adopting municipalities are not statistically
di¤erent from late adopting municipalities in terms of pre-reform trends of average wages by
education and skill levels (see Table 3). This supports our hypothesis, that decisions to open
one-stop shops are not correlated with existing trends in wages. To investigate the e¤ects of
27Given the staggered implementation of the reform over time, and di¤erence-in-di¤erence identication
strategy, for illustration purposes we show the wage di¤erentials for Lisbon, the capital of the country and
where over 15% of the countrys labour force is employed.
28Although there were also local elections in October 2005 for the municipality chief executive, the introduction
of On the Spot Firmshops seems unrelated with political a¢ liation. As discussed in Branstetter et al. (2013),
40% of the municipalities with one-stop shops had heads from the main opposition Social Democrat party.
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the entry deregulation reform on the returns to education and skill, we estimate the following
equation:
lnwijmkt = + Spotmt + Sk;it + (Spotmt  Sk;it) + X 0it + Z 0jt + d() + ijmkt (9)
where the dependent variable is the log of real hourly wages of worker i (in rm j, municipality
m with skill/education level k) in year t. Spotmt is our treatment dummy for municipalities
(m) with one-stop shops; it takes the value of 1 in the years when and after a one-stop shop
was introduced in the municipality, and zero otherwise.29 Sk;it is our measure of skills, or
educational attainment, of the worker (the levels Sk were described in Section 4.1). X 0it is a
matrix of individual characteristics, which include age and tenure and their squares, occupation
and type of contract; and Z 0jt is a matrix of rm characteristics, which include the log of size,
the ownership structure (whether domestic private, public or foreign), a dummy for whether
the rm is an exporter, and a dummy for whether the rm is multi-plant. Industry (ds) and
time (dt) dummies are also included in all specications to account for unobserved industry
characteristics and business shocks that a¤ect all rms and workers.
We also control for municipality (dm) xed e¤ects to parse out any municipality-specic
factors that may a¤ect our outcomes. Although we exploit cross-municipality and cross-time
variation in the implementation of the reform, having a panel of linked employer-employee data
allows us to include individual or worker-rm (match) xed e¤ects in our specications, di
and dij , respectively. These e¤ects help controlling for potential biases arising from individual
heterogeneity on the patterns of job mobility and sorting of workers across rms.
We have argued earlier that the policy was unexpected, and we have shown that early
adopting municipalities are not statistically di¤erent from late adopters in terms of pre-reform
trends in wages. However, to make sure that there are no di¤erential pre-existing trends in
wages of the di¤erent skill or educational groups, we saturate the model even further and include
municipality-skill (or education)-specic linear trends, dm  S  t. These absorb any potential
trends in wages at the municipality and skill (education) level. ijmkt is an error term assumed
to be white noise. In all of our specications standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level to account for potential correlation between observations within the same municipality,
the level of introduction of the policy. All results are robust to clustering by industry.
6.2 Results
Tables 6 and 7 report results from estimating equation (9). Two sets of analyses were conducted:
one to investigate the e¤ect of the rm entry deregulation on the returns to education (Table
29Some municipalities have more than one one-stop shop. Our treatment dummy is set to 1 after the rst
shop was opened.
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6); and a similar analysis to investigate the e¤ects on the returns to skill (Table 7). Observed
characteristics of workers (X 0it) and rms (Z
0
jt), as explained in the previous sections, along
with industry (ds) and year (dt) dummies are always controlled for. The di¤erent columns in
Tables 6 and 7 relate to di¤erent combinations of the other xed e¤ects included. In addition
to industry and year dummies, column (1) also controls for worker unobserved e¤ects (di);
column (2) further adds in municipality xed e¤ects (dm); column (3) controls for match (rm-
worker) unobserved e¤ects (dij) and municipality dummies; column (4) saturates the model even
further and also includes municipality-skill (or education) specic linear trends (dm  S  t).
The coe¢ cient on the Spotmt variable, , captures the average e¤ect of the reform on the wages
of the least educated or least skilled workers (the omitted categories). The absolute e¤ects on
other workers are given by the sum of  and the relevant element of . Our main interest lies in
, the vector of coe¢ cients on the interaction terms between the experiment variable, Spotmt,
and the educational (skill) levels, Sk;it. Each of its elements (k) captures the e¤ect of the
reform on the returns to di¤erent educational and skill levels.
[Table 6 about here]
Table 6 reports results for the returns to education. The interaction terms between the
educational levels and the reform dummy are always positive and statistically signicant at
the 1% level. In particular, the coe¢ cient on the interaction between the university education
dummy and the treatment variable is estimated at 0.045, suggesting that the introduction of
the "On the Spot Firm" program is associated with an increase in the returns to university
degrees of around 4.5 percentage points. Similarly, the reform increased the returns to upper
secondary education by around 2 percentage points relatively to the omitted category (primary
education). Therefore, our results show that the business registration reform is associated with
increased wage premia to better educated workers. The signicantly negative coe¢ cient on
Spotitself shows that the least educated workers lost from the introduction of one-stop shops.
Thus the premia arise partly from the ability of more educated workers to avoid this shock.30
These results are robust to the inclusion of worker-rm (match) unobserved e¤ects. This is
important because while in the individual xed-e¤ects models (columns (1) and (2)) the e¤ect
of the reform is identied from both individuals who stay in the same rm and those who move
rm after the policy change, in the match xed-e¤ects specications (columns (3) and (4)), the
e¤ect is identied only from variation over the time period for individuals who stay in the same
30The increased skills premia and the wage losses to least skilled workers might seem di¢ cult to reconcile with
Branstetter et al.s (2013) argument that new registrations were mostly among marginal rms - small, owned
by the poorly-educated and operating in low-tech sectors  i.e. the ones most readily deterred by heavy entry
costs. However, rms with no employees (only the owner) lie outside our data while marginal rms may increase
the demand for skilled services (accountancy, design, etc.) and existing larger rms, feeling or fearing increased
competition at the low end of the market, may have decided to upgrade their o¤er, and so substituted educated
for less-educated labor. Either would have seen the wages of the skilled out-stripping those of the less skilled.
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rm. This ensures that unobserved changes in composition of employment are not driving our
results. Results remain robust when we further control for linear trends by municipality and
education (column (4)); we nd no evidence of pre-existing trends, which grants validity to the
experiment. In sum, education and university degrees in particular became more valuable after
the deregulation reform.
Table 7 reports results of similar specications using skill levels, instead of educational
attainment levels. The estimates show that the "On the Spot Firm" reform is associated with
an increase in the returns to skill. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the high-skill
level and the experiment dummy is always statistically signicant at 1% across the di¤erent
model specications. Results remain robust when we include worker-rm (match) xed e¤ects,
thus identifying the increase in returns to skill from workers that remain in the same rm after
the reform (column (3)); and also when we control for linear trends by municipality and skill
(column (4)). The estimated coe¢ cient of 0.031 implies that the reform is associated with an
increase in the wage premium for high-skilled workers of around 3 percentage points. The
premium for medium-skilled workers, however, is smaller and of uncertain signicance, while
the least skilled appear to have lower wages in treatment municipalities by half to one percent.
Our ndings of increased returns to skill and education following the reform are in line with
the simple theoretical framework linking competition and relative wages, outlined in Section 2.
Boone (2000) shows that with increased competition a given cost di¤erence between rms is
mapped into a larger prot di¤erence. If skilled (or educated) workers produce at lower costs,
that result implies that prots become more sensitive to skills, and rms have incentives to
pay more for skilled workers. Our results of wage premia for skills and education following the
deregulation are consistent with that type of reallocation.
[Table 7 about here]
The validity of our experiment and identication strategy is supported by the fact that (1)
we control for pre-existing tends by municipality-skill (or municipality-education) and nd no
evidence of such pre-existing trends; (2) there is no statistically signicant di¤erence between
early and late adopting municipalities in terms of previous trends of the variables of interest;
and (3) the policy was unanticipated and rolled-out randomly across municipalities over time.
Ideally, we would also have been able to conduct a placebo using the period prior to the de-
regulation. However, the period since the data became available until the start of our sample
was characterized by several trade shocks that increased foreign competition, and which have
been shown elsewhere to a¤ect the returns to skill. In particular, the period between 1989 and
1998 was characterized by several episodes of sharp exchange rate uctuations and by the im-
plementation of the European Single Market Program in 1992.31 Guadalupe (2007) shows that
31The Portuguese Escudo experienced a real appreciation of over 20% over 1989-1992 and several other episodes
of sharp uctuations between 1992 and 1998 under the Exchange Rate Mechanism. See Abreu, 2003; or Adão
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both these events resulted in increased returns to skill in the UK. Moreover, the adoption of the
Euro in 1999 has been shown to have increased foreign competition through higher foreign entry,
with similar potential e¤ects on the returns to skill. For example, Bergin and Lin (2012) show
that the Euro had positive and statistically signicant e¤ects on the extensive margin of trade
between 1995 and 2002.32 Exposure to these shocks will vary with municipalitiesexposure to
the export market, and given that the e¤ects of such trade shocks are typically extended over
time, it would not be surprising to nd signicant e¤ects on the returns to skills in any placebo
period.33
6.3 Other Channels
This section is devoted to investigating the role of alternative mechanisms in explaining the
e¤ects estimated in the previous section. In particular, we investigate the potential role of
skill-biased technical change (SBTC). If the deregulation led to an increase in investment in
technology, and if technology is biased in favor of skilled workers, as commonly found in the
literature on the e¤ect of technology on the labour market,34 this would increase returns to
skill (or education) through increased demand for skills. To investigate this potential indirect
mechanism underlying the e¤ects, we control for R&D intensity and its interactions with the
skill and education levels. We re-estimate the more saturated models for the quasi-natural
experiment on the returns to skill and education, from columns (2)-(4) of Tables 6 and 7,
adding the industrys R&D intensity (R&Dintst) and interaction terms between R&D intensity
and the education and skill levels (R&Dintst  Sk;it).
The results from this exercise are reported in Table 8. Columns (1) through (3) report the
results for the returns to education, controlling explicitly for R&D intensity at the industry-year
level.35 R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure per employee (in real terms). R&D
expenditure data is from the OECD-STAN dataset, and the number of employees is from the
QP matched employer-employee data.36 The coe¢ cients on the interaction between the reform
dummy and the education levels remain positive and statistically signicant at 1% level, and of
and Pina, 2003, for details.
32The authors nd that the extensive margin of trade responded several years ahead of EMU implementation
and ahead of overall trade volume.
33A signicant result in such a placebo test would arise given correlation between export exposure and the
location of the "On the Spot Firm" o¢ ces. Such a correlation, however, would not undermine our identication
since exporting is very largely the preserve of large companies, while the increased rm entry pertains only to
small rms. Moreover, the trade shocks that occurred in the previous decades had died away by 2002.
34See Katz and Autor (1999) for a survey of this literature.
35The columns of Table 8 include the same progression of the sets of xed e¤ects and other controls as those
in columns (2)-(4) of Tables 6 and 7 in the previous section.
36Data for production at the industry level is not available from the OECD-STAN for Portugal after 2005,
so we cannot construct R&D intensity as the ratio between R&D expenditures and total industrial production.
However, we construct that measure using U.S. data; and based on the assumption that the ranking of these
measures is stable across countries (see Romalis, 2003; and Rajan and Zingales, 1998; among others), we estimate
the models in Table 8 using the US-based measure of R&D intensity. All results, available upon request, remain
robust.
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similar magnitude as those reported in Table 6. The estimated e¤ect of R&D is positive and
signicant but the interactions with the education levels, although positive, are not statistically
signicant. In sum, controlling for R&D intensity and allowing for its e¤ects on the returns to
education does not signicantly a¤ect our coe¢ cients of interest. This suggests that the e¤ect
of the reform on the returns to education is not driven by skill-biased technical change.
[Table 8 about here]
Results for the returns to skill are reported in columns (4) through (6) of Table 8. We con-
tinue to obtain positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cients on the reform dummy interacted
with skills, and of similar magnitude, even after controlling for R&Dintst and R&DintstSk;it.
We obtain positive coe¢ cients on R&D intensity and its interactions, but they are statistically
signicant only for the medium-skilled (columns (5) and (6)). This suggests some role for SBTC,
but only for the medium skilled, while the coe¢ cients of interest are not signicantly a¤ected.
The results show that the coe¢ cients of interest remain largely unchanged after we control for
R&D intensity and its interactions with skill or education. This is evidence that the increased
returns to skill and education are not determined exclusively as an indirect e¤ect of SBTC, and
support increased competition as a more direct channel.
As discussed in Guadalupe (2007), R&D measures change slowly over time and are often
noisily measured. Therefore, controlling for R&D intensity and its interactions with skill or
education is not a conclusive test of SBTC as an underlying mechanism. Furthermore, it
would be preferable to use R&D intensity at the municipality level, but data is not available
at that level of geographical disaggregation.37 However, in the absence of such data and better
proxies for SBTC, it is still of interest to obtain an estimate of the e¤ects of R&D. If the reform
induced higher investments in R&D, the coe¢ cients on its interactions with the skill (education)
dummies would capture the potential indirect e¤ect on the returns to skill (education).
Another potential cause of wage inequality is changes in unionization. An established hy-
pothesis is that unions raise wages more at the bottom of the distribution and thus are thought
to have a compression e¤ect on wage inequality. The institutions that govern unionization and
collective bargaining in the UK, US or Canada provide a good environment to study the link
between unionization and wage inequality.38 A number of studies estimate that a fall in union
membership can account for a large share of the rise in male wage inequality (see Card, 2001,
for evidence on the US; Machin, 1997, for the UK; and Card et al., 2003, for a comparison
37There is some data availability for R&D expenditures at the rm-level, but for the period prior to 2004 this
is for a sample of rms only. Furthermore, that data is reported jointly with the rmsstart-up costs. However, to
check the robustness of results, we re-estimated the regressions in Table 8 using R&D intensity (R&D expenditure
per employee) at the rm-level. Results remain robust and are available upon request. All results also remain
robust to the use of levels or logarithms of R&D.
38 In particular, negotiations are conducted at the rm-level and there is no general mechanism to extend union
wage oors beyond the organized sector.
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between Canada, UK and US). If deregulation leads to lower union power through increased
competition, it could result in an increase in the returns to skill.
However, as discussed in Card (2001), it is very di¢ cult to conduct such studies for most
European countries (and Australia) because (1) there is no clear distinction in those coun-
tries between the union and non-union sectors; and (2) collective bargaining is widespread and
wages are set for non-unionized as well as unionized workers, via extension mechanisms that
widen provisions to most of the labor force. Portugal shares these characteristics with most
European countries. As discussed in Cardoso and Portugal (2005), most collective agreements
are industry-wide, guided by national framework agreements. Importantly, extension mech-
anisms are widespread in the economy. There are voluntary extensions whereby a party can
subscribe an agreement that they did not sign initially;39 and government compulsory exten-
sions which widen the collective agreement to workers initially not covered by it, or if bargaining
is prevented in any way by a party.
Therefore, under this setting, the distinction between unionized and non-unionized workers
or rms is not well-dened, making a study about the e¤ects of unionization less meaning-
ful. Furthermore, union density data at the industry- or municipality-level is not available for
Portugal. Aggregate data from the OECD, however, shows that trade union density remained
constant at around 20-21% over the period covered in our paper, which suggests that the incent-
ives for union membership did not change. This largely removes the concern that the reform
might have a¤ected the wage distribution via changes in union behavior.
6.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present further robustness checks for the baseline results from Section 6.2. As
mentioned in Section 3, entrepreneurs are not required to register a new rm in the municipality
of the companys location. Although according to o¢ cial data, and also discussed in Branstetter
et al. (2013), the share of rms registered outside their municipality is "trivially small", in this
section we address that concern by aggregating municipalities to the district level. Portugal
is divided in 20 districts which are the largest geographic subdivision of the country with
administrative and judicial authority.40 Given their size and administrative authority, it is very
unlikely that an entrepreneur would register a company outside of its district.
We test the robustness of our results to dening the reform dummy at the district level,
Spotrt, which takes the value of one in the years when and after the rst one-stop shop was
introduced in a district, and zero otherwise. We then substitute this for Spotmt in equation
(9), leaving everything else the same. Results from estimating this new equation with the
39Also, rms that sign an agreement with a trade union generally extend its application to all their employees,
independently of the workers union membership status.
40Municipalities are geographical sub-units of districts.
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di¤erent combinations of xed e¤ects as described in section 6.2 are reported in Table 9. The
results are consistent with those obtained previously, suggesting that the introduction of the
business registration reform within districts increased the returns to education and skill. When
we consider the existence of regional "On the Spot Firm" o¢ ces, we obtain a wage premium
of around 5% to university graduates, and of around 4% to high-skilled workers due to the
reform.41
[Table 9 about here]
The data includes observations on workers who have increased their educational level and
who change skill levels (e.g. as a result of promotions within rms or between rm job mobility)
over time. It can be argued that the reform might induce changes in the level of skill of the
worker, thus changing the composition of each skill group. To check the robustness of our results
to these potential selection e¤ects, we now use a sample that includes only workers who have
not changed education and skill levels over the period. We then estimate the more saturated
models, corresponding to those reported in columns (2)-(4) of Tables 6 and 7. The results from
this exercise are presented in Table 10.
[Table 10 about here]
Results for the returns to education, reported in the upper part of Table 10, remain robust
for this subsample of workers. The coe¢ cients on the interaction terms between the reform
dummy and the educational levels remain positive and statistically signicant. We continue to
estimate a wage premium for university (high school) graduates of around 5% (2%), as a result
of the reform. The results for the returns to skill are reported in the lower panel of Table 10. We
obtain a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the interaction between the "On the
Spot Firm" dummy and the high-skill dummy, suggesting an increase in wages of high-skilled
workers of around 3%. Therefore, results reported in Table 10 remain robust for this subsample,
suggesting that the e¤ects estimated are not driven by workers that change education or skill
level after the reform.
In sum, we have found a positive association between the business registration reform and
increased competition. We have identied small declines in the wages of the least educated, wage
premia for better educated workers, and larger premia for higher levels of educational attainment
as a consequence of the reform. We have also estimated wage premia for highly skilled workers.
We include worker-rm xed e¤ects and thus identify the e¤ects from individuals that stay in
the same rm after the reform. Results are therefore supportive of education and skills becoming
more valuable, and are not driven by changes in employment composition after the reform.
41Although due to space considerations Table 9 reports only the coe¢ cients on the "spot" variable and on
its interactions with education and skills, we continue to control for the workers skill and education levels in all
regressions, as in tables 6 and 7. The coe¢ cients on the stand-alone skill and education terms remain positive
and statistically signicant.
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7 Conclusion
This paper uses matched employer-employee data for the universe of private sector rms and
workers in Portugal and a comprehensive episode of rm entry deregulation, unique in the in-
dustrialized world, as a quasi-natural experiment. We investigate the e¤ects of the deregulation
on rm entry, and how the resulting increase in competition a¤ects the returns to skill and
education. Prior to 2005, starting a new business in Portugal involved 11 procedures and 78
days, with fees of around 13.5% of GDP per capita. In 2005, new legislation created the "On
the Spot Firm" program with the purpose of reducing the time, cost and complexity of start-
ing a business. This initiative established one-stop shops where an entrepreneur can register
a company in less than an hour in one single o¢ ce, and with fees of around 3% of GDP per
capita.
We start by investigating the e¤ect of the program on rm entry and on competition within
industries and municipalities. Our results suggest that the reform increased the creation of
new rms, and decreased industry concentration ratios and Herndahl-Hirschman indices. We
then use the business registration reform as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the ef-
fects on the returns to education and skill. We exploit cross-municipality-year variation in the
implementation of the business registration reform for identication. Our results suggest that
it increased the relative wage of university graduates by around 5%, and that of high-skilled
workers by around 3%. Less educated and low-skilled workers, on the other hand, appear to
have lost slightly from the reform.
We estimate several specications of the wage model, controlling for di¤erent types of time
invariant unobserved e¤ects, as well as for trends by municipality-skill (or education). In par-
ticular, we are able to allow for worker-rm (match) xed e¤ects and thus identify the impact
of the reform solely from individuals who stay in the same rm after the deregulation. This is
strongly indicative that we have identied a price e¤ect rather than one driven by individuals
changes in employment: that is, education and skills seem to have become more valuable after
the reform. The "On the Spot Firm" program implemented in Portugal in 2005 provides an
exceptional context to evaluate the e¤ect of comprehensive rm entry deregulation. Given the
general evidence that competition-enhancing policies increase innovation and growth (Aghion
et al., 2009), evaluating the e¤ects of a precisely dened policy such as this is important for
future policy advice to other countries.
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9 Tables
Table 1: Sample size
Year All rms Start ups % Start ups Workers
"On the Spot"
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
2002 210,367 11,067 1,834,497
2003 217,618 13,316 1,881,599
2004 223,084 12,787 1,938,520
2005 239,992 14,677 22.94 2,103,552
2006 241,397 15,039 47.73 2,134,839
2007 246,282 16,299 57.47 2,191,564
2008 249,695 16,833 73.69 2,241,624
2009 242,861 14,049 72.97 2,159,665
Total 1,871,296 114,067 42,567 16,485,860
Source: Own calculations based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2009).
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Table 2: Industry concentration (CR5) and returns to skill and education
CR5 and returns to skill
(1) (2) (3)
Medium-skill 0.059*** 0.051*** 0.050***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
High-skill 0.149*** 0.091*** 0.078***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
CR5 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.026*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Med-skill*CR5 -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.036***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
High-skill*CR5 -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.040***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
R2 0.10 0.10 0.12
CR5 and returns to education
(1) (2) (3)
SecEduc -0.003 -0.010** -0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
HscEduc 0.020*** -0.012 -0.013
(0.007) (0.014) (0.013)
UniEduc 0.168*** 0.080*** 0.049***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.016)
CR5 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.002
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
SecEduc*CR5 0.016** 0.014* 0.007
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
HscEduc*CR5 0.015* 0.011 0.003
(0.009) (0.007) (0.004)
UniEduc*CR5 0.020 0.012 0.004
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
R2 0.09 0.09 0.12
Note: Log-hourly real wages as dependent variable. CR5
is the employment top-5 concentration ratio. SecEduc
- lower secondary education (ISCED2); HscEduc - high
school (upper secondary) education (ISCED3); UniEduc
- University education (ISCED56). Column (1) includes
individual xed e¤ects, industry and year dummies, and
age and tenure (and their squares) of the worker as cov-
ariates. Column (2) also includes dummies for education
(skill) interacted with year. Column (3) further satur-
ates the model with dummies for municipality, and in-
cludes the occupation and type of contract of the worker,
the log of size and the ownership of the rm, as well
as whether the rm is multiplant or exporter. Robust
standard errors, clustered by industry, in parentheses. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: Pre-reform average growth rates of outcome variables
Late adopters Early adopters Di¤erence P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New rms 0.125 0.155 -0.030 0.596
(0.039) (0.033)
CR5 - Employment 0.574 0.467 0.106 0.075
(0.036) (0.047)
CR5 - Sales 0.330 0.251 0.079 0.153
(0.034) (0.041)
HHI - Employment 0.172 0.191 -0.019 0.679
(0.028) (0.037)
HHI- Sales 0.089 0.088 0.001 0.993
(0.021) (0.027)
Wages
Overall 0.013 0.006 0.007 0.262
(0.004) (0.005)
Low-skilled 0.0130 0.007 0.006 0.301
(0.004) (0.005)
Medium-skilled 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.449
(0.004) (0.005)
High-skilled -0.013 -0.003 -0.010 0.342
(0.006) (0.008)
PrimEduc 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.320
(0.003) (0.004)
SecEduc 0.004 -0.005 0.009 0.255
(0.005) (0.005)
HscEduc -0.013 -0.006 -0.007 0.529
(0.007) (0.007)
UniEduc 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.898
(0.011) (0.012)
Note: outcome variables are measured as initial growth trends (between 2002 and 2004)
of average wages and number of new rms, and of industry concentration ratios and
HHI at the municipality level. Standard errors in parentheses. The p-value relates to
the test of the null hypothesis of equality between the means (proportions). SecEduc -
lower secondary education; HscEduc - upper secondary (high school) education; UniEduc
- University education.
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Table 4: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on rm creation
E¤ect of "On the Spot Firm" on the # of rm start-ups (linear)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
On-the-spot-rm 3.479*** 0.652*** 0.404*** 3.472***
(0.722) (0.134) (0.120) (0.722)
Constant 0.491*** 1.913*** 1.568*** 0.628***
(0.069) (0.091) (0.130) (0.229)
E¤ect of "On the Spot Firm" on the # of rm start-ups (negative binomial)
On-the-spot-rm 1.341*** 0.190*** 0.086*** 1.339***
(0.183) (0.016) (0.021) (0.183)
ME 4.262*** 0.421*** 0.188*** 4.256***
Constant -0.389*** 0.168*** 0.018 -0.281*
(0.081) (0.048) (0.054) (0.149)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Municipality trends Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the number of new rms created. One observation per
municipality, industry and year corresponding to 54,839 records. ME stands for the mar-
ginal e¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm". Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality,
in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 5: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on industry concentration ratios (CR5) and
HHI of sales
E¤ect of "On the Spot Firm" on CR5 (linear)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
On-the-spot-rm -0.252*** -0.024*** 0.004* -0.250***
(0.021) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021)
Constant 0.552*** 0.198*** 0.217*** 0.506***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024)
E¤ect of "On the Spot Firm" on CR5 (fractional dependent variable)
On-the-spot-rm -0.902*** -0.120*** 0.008 -0.898***
(0.070) (0.008) (0.009) (0.070)
ME -0.262*** -0.024*** 0.002 -0.260***
Constant 0.136*** -1.560*** -1.468*** -0.021
(0.051) (0.057) (0.056) (0.073)
E¤ect of "On the Spot Firm" on HHI (linear)
On-the-spot-rm -0.182*** -0.022*** 0.002 -0.180***
(0.015) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015)
Constant 0.149*** -0.091*** -0.082*** 0.111***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
E¤ect of "On the Spot Firm" on HHI (fractional dependent variable)
On-the-spot-rm -0.637*** -0.098*** 0.000 -0.632***
(0.052) (0.011) (0.014) (0.053)
ME -0.169*** -0.024*** 0.000 -0.173***
Constant -1.061*** -2.282*** -2.246*** -1.202***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.054)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Municipality trends Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the CR5 concentration ratio of sales in the top panel and
the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of sales in the bottom panel. One observation
per municipality, industry and year corresponding to 53,121 records. ME stands for
the marginal e¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm". Robust standard errors, clustered by
municipality, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 6: Quasi-natural experiment: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" on the returns to education
Returns to Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spot -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SecEduc*Spot 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HscEduc*Spot 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
UniEduc*Spot 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SecEduc 0.003** 0.003** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HscEduc 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.003 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
UniEduc 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.053*** 0.054***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Medium-skill 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
High-skill 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.071*** 0.071***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes Yes
Municipality*Educ trends Yes
Note: Log-hourly real wages as dependent variable. SecEduc - lower secondary educa-
tion (ISCED2); HscEduc - high school (upper secondary) education (ISCED3); UniEduc
- University education (ISCED56). ISCED levels are explained in section 4. Further
worker covariates include: tenure and age (and their squares), occupation, type of con-
tract of employment. Further rm covariates include: the log of size of the rm, the
ownership, multi-plant, and exporting status. All specications have the same num-
ber of observations: 12,489,080. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 7: Quasi-natural experiment: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" on the returns to skill
Returns to Skill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spot -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Medium-skill*Spot 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High-skill*Spot 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.031***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Medium-skill 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
High-skill 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.058*** 0.059***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SecEduc 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
HscEduc 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
UniEduc 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.077*** 0.077***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes Yes
Municipality*Skill trends Yes
Note: Log-hourly real wages as dependent variable. SecEduc - lower secondary edu-
cation (ISCED2); HscEduc - high school (upper secondary) education (ISCED3);
UniEduc - University education (ISCED56). Further worker covariates include: ten-
ure and age (and their squares), occupation, type of contract of employment. Further
rm covariates include: the log of size of the rm, the ownership, multi-plant, and ex-
porting status. All specications have the same number of observations: 12,489,080.
Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 8: Deregulation, R&D intensity and the e¤ects on the returns to education and skill
Returns to Education Returns to Skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spot -0.008** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SecEduc*Spot 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HscEduc*Spot 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
UniEduc*Spot 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.060***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Medium-skill*Spot 0.008*** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
High-skill*Spot 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
R&D intensity 0.004* 0.005** 0.005** 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SecEduc*R&Dint 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
HscEduc*R&Dint 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
UniEduc*R&Dint 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Medium-skill*R&Dint 0.003 0.004** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
High-skill*R&Dint 0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality*Educ(Skill) trends Yes Yes
Note: Log-hourly real wages as dependent variable. SecEduc - lower secondary education (ISCED2); HscEduc - high
school (upper secondary) education (ISCED3); UniEduc - University education (ISCED56). Further worker covariates
include: tenure and age (and their squares), occupation, type of contract of employment. Further rm covariates include:
the log of size of the rm, the ownership, multi-plant, and exporting status. R&D intensity (R&Dint) is total R&D
expenditures (in constant terms) per employee by industry and year for Portugal. This table reports only the coe¢ cients
on the "spot" and R&D variables and on their interactions with education and skills, but we continue to control for the
workers skill and education levels in all regressions, as in tables 6 and 7. All specications have the same number of
observations: 4,988,483. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
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Table 9: Quasi-natural experiment: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" by region on the returns
to education and skill
Returns to Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spot -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SecEduc*Spot 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HscEduc*Spot 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
UniEduc*Spot 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Returns to Skill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spot -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Medium-skill*Spot 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High-skill*Spot 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes Yes
Municipality*Educ(Skill) trends Yes
Note: Log-hourly real wages as dependent variable. SecEduc - lower secondary education
(ISCED2); HscEduc - high school (upper secondary) education (ISCED3); UniEduc - Uni-
versity education (ISCED56). Further worker covariates include: tenure and age (and their
squares), occupation, type of contract of employment. Further rm covariates include: the log
of size of the rm, the ownership, multi-plant, and exporting status. This table reports only
the coe¢ cients on the "spot" variable and on its interactions with education and skills, but we
continue to control for the workers skill and education levels in all regressions, as in tables 6
and 7. All specications have the same number of observations: 12,489,080. Robust standard
errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 10: Quasi-natural experiment: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" on the returns to
education and skill - subsample of workers that do not change education and skill levels
Returns to Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spot -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SecEduc*Spot 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HscEduc*Spot 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
UniEduc*Spot 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.048***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Returns to Skill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spot -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.005* -0.005*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Medium-skill*Spot 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
High-skill*Spot 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.033***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes Yes
Municipality*Educ(Skill) trends Yes
Note: Log-hourly real wages as dependent variable. SecEduc - lower secondary education
(ISCED2); HscEduc - high school (upper secondary) education (ISCED3); UniEduc - Uni-
versity education (ISCED56). Further worker covariates include: tenure and age (and their
squares), occupation, type of contract of employment. Further rm covariates include: the log
of size of the rm, the ownership, multi-plant, and exporting status. All specications have the
same number of observations: 7,138,634. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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10 Figures
Figure 1: "On the Spot Firm": introduction of one-stop shops by year and municipality
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
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A Appendix
Table A.1: SIC2 - Industries
Industry % Obs.
15 Manuf. of food, beverages & tobacco 3.32
17 Manuf. of textiles 2.52
18 Manuf. of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 3.17
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; Manuf. of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harnes & footwear 1.75
20 Manuf. of wood & prods of wood & cork, except furniture; Manuf. of straw & plaiting materials 1.35
21 Manuf. of pulp, paper and paper products 0.45
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 1.21
24 Manuf. of chemicals & chemical prods; Manuf. of coke, rened petroleum prods & nuclear fuel 0.92
25 Manuf. of rubber and plastic products 0.86
26 Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 1.89
27 Manuf. of basic metals 0.36
28 Manuf. of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 2.71
29 Manuf. of machinery and equipment n.e.c 1.28
31 Manuf. of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.68
32 Manuf. of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 0.48
33 Manuf. of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.21
34 Manuf. of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1.12
35 Manuf. of other transport equipment 0.27
36 Manuf. of furniture; others manufacturing activities, n.e.c. 1.67
37 Recycling 0.12
40 Electricity, gas & water 0.47
41 Water collection, treatment and distribution 0.14
45 Construction 11.88
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel 3.51
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 7.14
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and HH goods 9.95
55 Hotels and restaurants 7.10
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 2.80
61 Water transport 0.08
62 Air transport 0.42
63 Supporting & auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies and other tourist assistance 1.34
64 Post and telecommunications 1.50
65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 2.77
66 Insurance, pension funding and other complementary activities of social security 0.53
67 Activities auxiliary to nancial intermediation 0.24
70 Real estate activities 0.84
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and HH goods 0.28
72 Computer and related activities 0.94
73 Research and development 0.10
74 Other business activities 9.77
80 Education 2.33
85 Health and social work 6.10
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 0.18
91 Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. 1.24
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 1.10
93 Other service activities 0.92
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Table A.2: Classication of workers according to skill levels
Level Tasks Skills
1. Top executives (top man-
agement)
Denition of the rm general
policy or consulting on the or-
ganization of the rm; stra-
tegic planning; creation or ad-
aptation of technical, scientic
and administrative methods or
processes
Knowledge of management
and coordination of rms
fundamental activities; know-
ledge of management and
coordination of the funda-
mental activities in the eld
to which the individual is
assigned and that requires the
study and research of high
responsibility and technical
level problems
2. Intermediary executives
(middle management)
Organization and adaptation
of the guidelines established
by the superiors and directly
linked with the executive work
Technical and professional
qualications directed to
executive, research, and
management work
3. Supervisors, team leaders Orientation of teams, as direc-
ted by the superiors, but re-
quiring the knowledge of ac-
tion processes
Complete professional qualic-
ation with a specialization
4. Higher-skilled professionals Tasks requiring a high tech-
nical value and dened in gen-
eral terms by the superiors
Complete professional quali-
cation with a specialization
adding to theoretical and ap-
plied knowledge
5. Skilled professionals Complex or delicate tasks,
usually not repetitive, and
dened by the superiors
Complete professional qualic-
ation implying theoretical and
applied knowledge
6. Semi-skilled professionals Well dened tasks, mainly
manual or mechanical (no in-
tellectual work) with low com-
plexity, usually routine and
sometimes repetitive
Professional qualication in a
limited eld or practical and
elementary professional know-
ledge
7. Non-skilled professionals Simple tasks and totally de-
termined
Practical knowledge and easily
acquired in a short time
8. Apprentices, interns, train-
ees
Apprenticeship
Note: Hierarchical levels dened according to Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd (Source: Lima and Pereira, 2003).
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Table A.3: Summary statistics: means of covariates by educational levels and skill groups
All Education levels Skill levels
Covariate Workers ISCED1 ISCED2 ISCED3 ISCED56 Low Medium High
Ln(real hourly wage) 1.54 1.32 1.45 1.67 2.28 1.25 1.45 2.15
Education (baseline: ISCED1)
ISCED2 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.14
ISCED3 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.27
ISCED56 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.42
Skill level (baseline: low skill)
Medium 0.41 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.15
High 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.28 0.78
Women 0.44 0.40 0.42 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.38 0.40
Age 38.03 41.98 34.89 34.29 35.52 36.68 38.20 39.92
Tenure 7.67 9.07 6.70 6.60 6.05 5.96 8.05 9.76
Closed-end contract 0.27 0.23 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.36 0.24 0.17
Occupation (baseline: non-qualied workers)
Equipment operators 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.14 0.03
Production and related 0.22 0.37 0.20 0.07 0.01 0.18 0.34 0.08
Clerical & sales 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.21 0.07
Admin & managerial 0.16 0.06 0.18 0.34 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.13
Professional & Technical 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.21 0.25 0.03 0.07 0.31
Directors & Sc Specialists 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.53 0.02 0.01 0.37
ln(size of rm) 4.21 3.86 4.23 4.59 4.80 4.29 3.90 4.62
CR5 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.18
Ownership status (baseline: private national)
Public 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.08
Foreign 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.14
Exporter 0.44 0.38 0.44 0.50 0.53 0.40 0.42 0.53
Multi-plant 0.37 0.28 0.40 0.49 0.49 0.37 0.33 0.46
"On-the-Spot" municipality 0.41 0.33 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.40 0.38 0.47
Note. Means were computed using only observations with non-missing values for all covariates. Source: Own calculations based
on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2009).
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Figure 2: Wage growth di¤erential between high- and low-educated/skilled workers
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